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131


COMMENTARY: 1977 through 1980

When we last looked at corn, back in 1975, distant futures prices had fallen back to a range between $2.50 and $2.80. In 1976, futures prices edged sideways, then abruptly hit a high near $3.20 before descending even further than the lows of 1975. In 1977, corn once more traded in a close range as the year began. This time, however, things were different. 1973 and 1974 had been years of successive record?high prices, and correspondingly sharp collapses. In 1975, the high was again a sharp peak, but it failed to reach anywhere near the high set in 1974. In 1976, once again the year's high, though distinguished, fell short of the high for the previous year. And the years' lows were getting successively lower. In 1977, the bottom dropped out of the corn futures markets. It was the final downtrend correction to the great highs of '73 and '74. The reasons for the obvious chart cycles could be found in supply and demand. World corn production had actually declined in 1972 and 1974, while demand, spurred by growth in population and in livestock requiring feed, increased. After dipping in 1974, U.S. corn production rose steadily, encouraged by the high prices and strong markets. World production also rose. Inevitably, these successive record harvests chipped away at corn prices, year after year, until the abundance brought prices in August of 1977 to a four-year low. Profits per contract on a short sale were $5,400.

      The speculator who was exhausted by all this action in the grain markets might have turned to the cocoa futures contract for an easy ride. Like sugar and coffee, cocoa is a world commodity subject to extreme price fluctuations in


132

response to a very erratic supply and demand equation. In 1976-77 world cocoa bean production hit a nine-year low. Harvests in 1975?76 had trailed the record crop of the year before. The result: cocoa futures in 1977 hit a price 7 times higher than the average price in 1970. At a profit of $300 for every 1 cent move in the price of cocoa, figure for yourself when you could have gotten into the market, and what your profits would have been. You could conceivably have retired on this trade alone.

      (How? Let's say you bought two contracts when prices broke the old ceiling at 60¢, with a margin deposit of $1000 per contract. You continue to scale?in your purchases, buying two contracts each time that prices rise another 4¢, financing the trades with profits on the earlier contracts. Stop-loss is trailed 200 behind. After buying 72 contracts, you would have been stopped out at the reversal to $1.80. All 60 contracts bought at prices below $1.80 bring profits, while the ten purchased above $1.80 cause no gain or loss. Total profits on your $2000 investment: $1,083,600 or 54,180 percent.)

      1978 was a banner year for method traders following the markets in livestock futures. Live cattle prices had hit their last big highs in 1975. Afterward each subsequent year's high was successively lower, dragging down monthly average prices. The lows for the year, however, stabilized in 1977, and prices levelled out into the channel we see forming in mid-1977. This was the time to keep charts up-dated daily and watch for signs of recovery in cattle prices. The breakout up began in November of 1977, and carried the price of the August Live Cattle futures contract to a level of 61 cents a pound by May of 1978. Profit per contract: $8,000.


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      Even more impressive in 1978 was the action in pork bellies. A virtually parallel recovery to that in cattle futures almost doubled the price of the July 1978 Pork Belly contract. Here, too, prices had hit their record highs in 1975 by going over the $1.00 a pound mark. Once again, highs and lows for 1976 and 1977 showed pork belly prices retracing the big gain of 1975. But the low in 1977 resisted falling below the 45 cent a pound level, and pork belly traders kept their charts handy and looked for a strengthening, or collapse, in prices. The sideways channel in July 1978 Bellies formed in mid-1977 and lasted almost six months. The method trader waited patiently. Once prices made their break, the ascent was steep. In just three months, prices went from 50 cents a pound to 85 cents. On one (old size) contract of 36,000 pounds, profit was a very smart $12,600.


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      As the trader builds a file of charts over the years, many possible patterns in price movements become apparent. You have seen in the last few illustrations the phenomenon of three or four year price cycles, when prices rise successively for a number of years and then fall just as successively in reaction. This is by no means a rigid law or an always dependable pattern. It can be consulted, however, while you graph the formation of sideways channels and think about the direction of their next breakout. But don't jump ahead of the market based on an interpretation of long?range cycle patterns. As always, wait until a real move in prices confirms (or refutes) your analysis.

      In previous examples you have seen how, sometimes, a group of related commodities can rise or fall together. When such a group move does occur, the method trader stands to make enormous profits. The same chart analysis for one commodity will work for the others, multiplying your profits without any appreciable increase in risk or effort. If each and every one of the contracts considered qualifies, through an inspection of price history and price charts, for the method of trading we have proposed, then you can go ahead and play them all. When the group price move is over, one or two of the contracts may be seen to have moved farther and faster. No one could have predicted this ahead of time. By playing them all, the trader may be reasonably assured of catching the best possible actions One golden opportunity of this kind came in the lucrative grain and soybean futures markets of 1979.

      There are real world factors that tie together the prices of corn, wheat, oats, soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil. If one commodity can be fairly easily substituted for another by users, then the prices of those commodities will be linked. The supply and demand for one will affect the supply and demand for the others. This is especially true in the so-called


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"feed-grain complex," for farmers will switch the grain they buy for livestock feed if the price of one alternative falls or rises sharply. (Thus a simple view, for there are differences among them, as in their protein content, but the general principle holds true.) Corn is the dominant feed grain, but if wheat is very cheap, it too becomes a feasible and attractive substitute. Soybean meal, which with soybean oil is obtained as a by-product of crushing whole soybeans, is a very high-protein component now used extensively to enrich the quality of the feed. If demand for feed is up, chances are that demand for meal will be up, and so will prices across the board in the soybean and feed grain groups. Heavy stockpiles of supply in one or more of these commodities may depress prices for all. Likewise heavy world demand for, say, wheat will put pressure on other competitive grains, and on soybeans as well.

      With this sketch of interconnections in mind, take a look at the charts for the grain and soybean futures markets of 1979. Astonishing!! In contract after contract, from wheat to oats to soybean oil, an almost identical pattern (our favorite one!) shows up. What happened? A combination of forces in grain and bean supply and demand, plus a supportive set of long-term price cycles, came together momentarily to offer wide-awake traders a bonanza. Wheat had retraced its 1973 record high each year, until prices hit bottom in 1977. The big run?up had been partly fueled by massive Soviet purchases. World production and Russian crops increased thereafter, lowering prices. In 1978, the turnaround began. Harvest projections for the USSR began to hint at weaknesses, while a rising world standard of living continued to expand demand for the feedgrains. The Soviet decision to increase meat production ran headlong into an inefficient farm system plagued by bad weather. The record crops of 1977-1978 which


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had pushed prices so low helped keep them relatively stable through 1978 and early into 1979.

      1978-1979, however, showed a falling back from the record harvests of the season before. Rumors began to circulate about a possibly disastrous decline in the upcoming Soviet wheat crop. Thoughts went back to the spectacular bull markets of 1972-1973. On June 8, 1979, the U.S. Agriculture Department released a report officially estimating a sharp reduction in the potential 1979 Soviet grain harvest. If it held up, that estimate would mean another round of large purchases of American wheat and grains by the Soviets, and higher prices across the board for these related commodities.

      The race was on. Prices on the news shot up fantastically in just a few weeks' time, shattering one long-established sideways channel after another. Farmers held crops back from the market as they hoped for even higher prices, thus turning the bull market into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Volume and open interest on the futures exchanges increased dramatically as traders flocked to join the profitable bulls, or make their fortunes as bears when the prices settled back again. But the upward move in wheat prices was dampened by another USDA report, this one showing U.S. wheat supplies in 1979 at 2.1 billion bushels, 17 percent above the 1.8 billion bushels of 1978. In the following months prices bounced up and down in a wide range as both export forecasts and crop predictions fluctuated considerably. Then came the embargo on all grain sales to the Soviet Union in early 1980, and this particular episode in the grain markets came to an end.

      How could you have made a killing on these ups and downs in the grains and soybean complex? Following our method, charts for corn and wheat would have shown a narrow trading range developing around August, 1978 and continuing 1979. This would have signalled you to watch the


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charts for the other related commodities, checking both nearby and distant contracts in each of the commodities for the one exhibiting the most profitable price pattern. Between August of 1978 and March of 1979, easily recognizable sideways channels were formed in some contract month for corn, oats, soybeans, soybean meal and soybean oil. In the case of wheat, you could also trade contracts with narrow trading channels at the Minneapolis and Kansas City exchanges, as well as at Chicago. This would make a total of 8 different futures contract markets, all traded simultaneously through a single principle and uniform mode of analysis. Smith could simply have drawn in the narrow trading channels, set stop-orders to buy above the trading ranges, planned the stop-loss orders to trail, and then sat patiently back to wait for the move.

      In corn, oats, and the soybean complex, a first move started in February. This small upward jump resulted in the formation of another general sideways trading channel. Wheat set off the second, big move in April, taking the others with it at a time lag of about a month. You were now in the game for real. Let us be conservative, and say that you traded only one contract in each commodity, and only one contract month of that commodity, for a total of 8 contracts. You would have bought corn and oil in January, wheat in April, oats in May, and soybeans and soybean meal in June. As long as the charts were accurate and the stop-orders and stop-loss orders set, you didn't have to worry about which commodity was really behind the big move, or which would go the farthest. You had them all covered. How would the results have looked?


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MAXIMUM PROFITS: GRAINS AND SOYBEAN COMPLEX, 1979

Commodity

Bought

Sold

Profit
Per
Contract

Margin

Wheat
(Chicago)
Dec. '79

$3.45

$5.10

$8,250

$1,000

Wheat (K.C.)
Sept. '79

$3.25

$4.75

$7,500

$1,000

Wheat (MPLS)
Sept. '79

$3.25

$4.75

$7,500

$1,000

Soybeans
Jan. '80

$7.30

$8.40

$5,500

$1,200

Soy. Meal
Dec. '79

$200

$230

$3,000

$1,200

Soy. Oil
Dec. '79

24.4¢

29.2¢

$2,880

$1,200

Corn Dec. '79

$2.56

$3.26

$3,500

$600

Oats Sept. '79

$1.60

$1.84

$1,200

$500

 

TOTALS

$39,330

$7,700

RETURN ON INVESTMENT: 510%

      Even if one were to subtract a full twenty percent from this maximum profit as an allowance for commissions, poor executions, and exits from the market after the reversal was underway, total profits would still be $31,470 or 408 percent of the initial margin requirement. What other investment medium that is both rational and legal offers you a 400 percent return on your investment in less than five months time?

      1980 began as the most spectacular year in commodity futures trading since the grain markets of 1972-1973 first brought international fame to the speculative trade. The history books had to be re-written once more as the prices of the "precious metals" -- gold, silver, platinum, even copper


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